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According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), human-induced climate change will transform the eco-
logical balance of our planet and lead to dramatic societal
problems.1  Based on these projections, it seems natural that the
international society would be doing everything in its power to
combat climate change.  Unfortunately, this is not the case.  Be-
cause the global economy relies so heavily on the burning of fos-
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Article is part of a research project entitled “The Capability of International Gov-
ernance Systems in the Arctic to Contribute to the Mitigation of Climate Change
and Adjust to Its Consequences (CIGSAC)” and is funded by the Academy of Fin-
land (Project No. 8110564).  The author would like to thank professor Lauri Han-
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1 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS
12 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm.
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sil fuels, the primary cause of climate change, forming effective
mechanisms to control and mitigate climate change is not easy.2
The development of the Kyoto Protocol3 (Protocol) demon-
strates the difficulty of organizing an effective international re-
sponse to climate change.  The events leading up to the Protocol
began at the Rio Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment.4  At the conference, 156 countries signed the 1992 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change5 (Climate
Convention or Convention), an agreement setting forth general
obligations on nation-states (states) to mitigate climate change
and adapt to its consequences.6  In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to
the Convention was adopted.7  The Protocol imposed concrete
obligations on states to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions
during the first commitment period, 2008-2012.8  However, after
both the United States and Australia refused to ratify the Proto-
col,9 it seemed that the Protocol would not become operational.
Following its ratification by Russia, the Protocol became binding
on February 16, 2005.10
Even though the Protocol commits its state parties to certain
emissions reductions, these standards do not meet those recom-
2 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 2 (2007), available at  http://www.ipcc.ch/ipcc
reports/ar4-wg1.htm.
3 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 3, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998),
available at  http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol].
4 See  Five Years After Rio: What was the Earth Summit?, http://www.iisd.org/
rio+5/earthsummit.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2007) (providing information on the Rio
Conference and links to related documents).
5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of Ratifica-
tion, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/
2631.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/
essential_background/convention/items/2627.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
8 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3.
9 FARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
CHANGE REGIME: A GUIDE TO RULES, INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 15 (2005).
10 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of Ratifica-
tion, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/status_of_ratification/items/2613.
php (last visited Oct. 26, 2007); Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Q & A:
Russia and the Kyoto Protocol, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_
the_world/russia_kyoto_q_a.cfm (last visited Oct. 26, 2007).
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mended by climate scientists.11  Furthermore, developing states
lack any emissions-reduction obligations.12  For instance, China
and India are among the worst emitters of greenhouse gases but
have no reduction commitments.13
This is alarming news for those states and people who will suf-
fer the most severe consequences of climate change.  The worst
emitters of greenhouse gases are either outside the Protocol alto-
gether or have no binding reduction obligation.  Even if the
United States and Australia decided to ratify the Protocol, its re-
duction standards are clearly inadequate.
In light of this regulatory failure, victims of climate change
have started to think of ways to bring the worst emitters of
greenhouse gases to justice.  When signing the Climate Conven-
tion, the small island states declared that their participation did
not relieve the legal responsibility of those states contributing the
most emissions.14  Tuvalu, a small island state in the South Pacific
whose land will be inundated within the next fifty years, an-
nounced in 2002 that it would take Australia to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).15  With the help of the Inuit Circumpolar
Council (ICC), the Inuit recently filed a petition against the
United States with the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American States
(OAS).16  The 167-page petition carefully details the particular
human rights the United States has violated in the course of be-
ing the world’s worst emitter of greenhouse gases.17  The petition
asserts that these emissions are directly correlated to the destruc-
tion of the Inuit’s environment and culture.18  Ultimately, the
11 Sarah A. Peay, Joining the Asia-Pacific Partnership: The Environmentally Sound
Decision?, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 477, 481 (2007).
12 Id.  at 480-81.
13 BBC NEWS, Climate Change: The Big Emitters , July 4, 2005, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3143798.stm.
14 See infra  notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
15 BBC NEWS, Tiny Pacific Nation Takes on Australia , Mar. 4, 2002, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/asia-pacific/1854118.stm.  No more detailed information is
available on the subject, and Tuvalu has not specified its plan as to how and when it
will file its petition with the ICJ.
16 Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Petition to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming




18 Id. at 5.
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goal of their petition is to have the IACHR pronounce that the
United States has breached the Inuit’s internationally guaranteed
human rights.19
The legal strategies of Tuvalu and the ICC are the only cases in
which a victim of climate change has announced that it will take
its claim to international legal proceedings.  However, other legal
mechanisms may also be available.  For instance, the dispute set-
tlement procedures under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)20 and the advisory opinion of the ICJ
have both been endorsed as promising legal responses to climate
change.21
This Article argues that the current structure of international
law makes it unlikely that victims of climate change will find jus-
tice through international legal proceedings.  Part I examines the
various international legal proceedings that could provide re-
course for victims of climate change.  Part II focuses on the only
case that has proceeded to the submission stage, the above-men-
tioned Inuit petition to the IACHR.  Importantly, the Inuit’s
human rights petition is currently the best possibility for success
in international litigation since evidence already exists that cli-
mate change has caused clearly identifiable damage to the Arctic
environment.22  The Article concludes by analyzing the likeli-
hood of successfully combating climate change by utilizing the
legal mechanisms discussed in Parts I and II.
I
TAKING CLIMATE CHANGE TO INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
Various legal mechanisms could potentially help bring the
worst greenhouse gas emitters to justice.  Both national and in-
ternational legal avenues exist, but this Article focuses only on
international law.23  As a preliminary matter, it is important to
19 Id.  at 7.
20 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
21 See, e.g. , Rebecca Elizabeth Jacobs, Comment, Treading Deep Waters: Substan-
tive Law Issues in Tuvalu’s Threat to Sue the United States in the International Court
of Justice , 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 103, 115 (2005).
22 See ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 990-92 (2005),
available at  http://www.acia.uaf.edu/pages/scientific.html.
23 For more information regarding litigation to combat climate change in various
nations, see Climate Justice: Cases, http://www.climatelaw.org/cases (last visited Oct.
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understand the litigation terminology used in international law.
Dispute settlement mechanisms are normally classified as either
political or legal.  The former resolves disputes without produc-
ing a legally binding decision.24  The latter refers to mechanisms
such as arbitration and judicial settlement in which a third party
makes a decision that is legally binding on the disputing states.25
This clear-cut distinction between legal and political settlement
mechanisms does not extend to the actual disputes, for both
types of disputes are regulated in international law.26  In this Ar-
ticle, the broader term “international legal proceedings” is used
to denote all those procedures that may be helpful for victims of
climate change, regardless of whether the proceedings produce a
legally binding decision.  Good examples of such procedures are
the decisions by the supervisory bodies of international treaties,
conciliation procedures, and advisory opinions of the ICJ.27
Because the damage resulting from climate change is covered
by various spheres of international law as well as specific mecha-
nisms to implement legal responsibility, Part I is divided into
three sections: climate regime, norms of general international
law, and sector-specific regimes.  To at least some degree, each
section includes discussion related to primary norms (norms that
regulate the behavior of a legal entity), secondary norms (norms
that determine the consequences of a breach of regulated behav-
ior),28 and procedures to deal with behavior that violates the
regulations.
The Climate Convention includes general rules that require
virtually all states in the world to begin to slow down climate
change and adapt to its effects.29  Negotiated within the frame-
14, 2007).  For more information regarding litigation within the framework of the
United States legal system, see David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radi-
cal Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation , 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003).
24 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 279-80 (2d ed. 2005).
25 See id.  at 281-82.
26 See id.  at 278-95, 326.
27 See Jacobs, supra note 21, at 115.
28 The division into primary and secondary norms emerged during the United Na-
tions International Law Commission’s state responsibility project. See  U.N. Int’l
Law Comm’n, Second Report on State Responsibility , ¶¶ 12-30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
233 (Apr. 20, 1970) (prepared by  Roberto Ago), available at http://untreaty.un.org/
ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_233.pdf.
29 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4, May 9,
1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at  http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC].  Currently, 192 countries
have ratified the Climate Convention. United Nations Framework Convention on
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work of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol commits industrial
countries to specific, definite emissions reductions.30  The climate
regime, which consists of both the Convention and the Protocol,
also includes rules outlining how disputes concerning the regime
are to be handled.31  Furthermore, the climate regime creates
bodies that monitor implementation of the Convention.32  The
Compliance Committee of the Protocol has the authority to de-
termine different forms of sanctions if a state fails to comply with
its obligations.33
General international law includes principles that can be inter-
preted to compel states to conform to certain standards of behav-
ior, including actions related to climate policy.  General
international law on state responsibility determines the conse-
quences of an illegal act, and these rules are also applied lex
generalis  in cases where a specific regime provides no rules of its
own.  In principle, general international law is to be applied to all
international legal proceedings, either individually or together
with sector-specific rules.
Since the effects of climate change are so comprehensive,
greenhouse gas emissions may also contravene other legal inter-
national obligations, such as those relating to UNCLOS.34  The
norms for these sectors, as well as their related independent
mechanisms for monitoring and settling disputes, constitute a
third route to bringing about legal responsibility for greenhouse
gas emissions.
A. Climate Regime
The parties negotiating the Climate Convention knew that cli-
mate change would continue despite the general measures laid
out in the Convention.  Early in the negotiations, the Alliance of
Small Island States (AOSIS) attempted to include an article in
the Convention that would have implemented a specific standard
Climate Change, Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/
convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).  Like-
wise, 175 parties have ratified the Kyoto Protocol.  United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/
2830.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
30 Kyoto Protocol, supra  note 3, art. 3.
31 See YAMIN & DEPLEDGE, supra  note 9, at 382-84.
32 Id.  at 389-92.
33 Id.  at 389.
34 UNCLOS, supra  note 20.
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of state responsibility.35  Even though the question of state re-
sponsibility was still an issue during the fifth negotiating round in
New York, it was fully deleted from the final Convention text
due to objections from industrial countries.36  Many small island
states responded to this omission by making official declarations
to the Convention.  For example, Tuvalu made the following dec-
laration upon its signing of the Convention:
The Government of Tuvalu declares its understanding that sig-
nature of the Convention shall in no way constitute a renunci-
ation of any rights under international law concerning state
responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change, and
that no provisions in the Convention can be interpreted as
derogating from the principles of general international law.37
Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati made
similar declarations.38
Since the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions-reduction standards were
too lax to effectively combat climate change, small island states
also made declarations concerning the Protocol.  Kiribati’s decla-
ration echoed those made by the small island states when they
first signed the Climate Convention.39  Other parties such as
Niue and the Cook Islands issued declarations similar to this one
made by the Republic of Nauru:
The Government of the Republic of Nauru declares its under-
standing that the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol shall in no
way constitute a renunciation of any rights under international
law concerning State responsibility for the adverse effects of
climate change . . . . The Government of the Republic of Na-
uru further declares that, in the light of the best available sci-
entific information and assessment of climate change and
impacts, it considers the emissions of [sic] reduction obliga-
35 RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PREVENTION DUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 50-52 (2005).
36 See id.  at 52-53.
37 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Status of Ratifica-
tion (2007), http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/status_of_
ratification/application/pdf/unfccc_conv_rat.pdf (declaration number two).
38 Id. (declaration numbers seven (Papua New Guinea), five (Fiji), eleven (Solo-
mon Islands), and three (Kiribati)).
39 Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification (2007), http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_
protocol/background/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/kp_ratifcation.pdf (dec-
laration number six: “The Government of the Republic of Kiribati declares its un-
derstanding that accession to the Kyoto Protocol shall in no way constitute a
renunciation of any rights under international law concerning State responsibility for
the adverse effects of the climate change and that no provision in the Protocol can
be interpreted as derogating from principles of general international law.”).
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tions in Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol to be inadequate to
prevent the dangerous anthropogenic interference with the cli-
mate system . . . . [Nauru also declares] that no provisions in
the Protocol can be interpreted as derogating from the princi-
ples of general international law[.]40
With these declarations, the small island states made it clear
that they did not believe that the emissions reductions in the Ky-
oto Protocol were sufficient to prevent the dangerous interfer-
ence with the climate system as specified in Article 2 of the
Climate Convention.41  In addition, they demonstrated their be-
lief that the worst greenhouse gas emitters can still be held le-
gally responsible for their actions.
From the viewpoint of the small island states, the greatest
problem with the climate regime is that so far, commitments to
emissions reductions have been relatively mild in comparison
with those demanded by the scientific community.42  This prob-
lem is exacerbated because the worst polluters have not commit-
ted themselves to the Protocol and because developing nations
have no binding obligations to reduce emissions.43  Furthermore,
no long-term international climate policy can be established, for
the climate regime requires all states to consent to their reduc-
tion obligations every five years.44  Negotiations began in 2005
for reducing emissions during the second commitment period,
2012-2016.45
Given this information, could these small island states use the
climate regime to bring the worst emitters of greenhouse gases to
justice?  A natural starting point is the Climate Convention,
40 Id.  (declaration number seven).
41 UNFCCC, supra note 29, art. 2.
42 VERHEYEN, supra  note 35, at 62-67.
43 See UNFCCC, supra  note 29, art. 4(2).
44 See  Kyoto Protocol, supra  note 3, art. 4(9), art. 21(7).
45 Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol, Montreal, Can., Nov. 28 - Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the
Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol  3, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2006), available at  http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a01.pdf.  A 2005 conference in Montreal for the parties to the
Climate Convention simultaneously served as a meeting for the parties to the Kyoto
Protocol and established the negotiation process to determine the mitigation com-
mitments that would follow the first commitment period. Id. ; see also  Ad Hoc
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto
Protocol, Bonn, F.R.G., May 17-25, 2006, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol , U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/AWG/2006/2 (July 18, 2006), available at  http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
2006/awg1/eng/02.pdf.
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which carries nearly universal force and imposes many general
obligations on its state parties. Article 2 of the Convention states:
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related le-
gal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt
is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous an-
thropogenic interference with the climate system.  Such a level
should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow eco-
systems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that
food production is not threatened and to enable economic de-
velopment to proceed in a sustainable manner.46
Article 2 can be seen as legally significant because it consti-
tutes the object and purpose of the Convention in the meaning of
the customary law of treaties.47  Thus, Article 2 could be used as
an aid to interpret the other articles of the Convention.  More-
over, in accordance with Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, a state that signs a convention must restrain
itself from measures that would defeat the object and purpose of
the convention.48  Often, however, Article 2 is seen only as a
non-binding text for setting the political objectives of the climate
regime.49
Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Climate Convention could argua-
bly create a legally binding obligation.50  This Article requires in-
dustrial countries to commit to lowering their greenhouse gas
emissions by the year 2000 to the level they emitted in 1990—an
objective they have failed to meet.51  According to the main-
stream view however, even this goal was drafted to constitute
more of a soft objective.52  The Kyoto Protocol also includes de-
46 UNFCCC, supra  note 29, art. 2.
47 VERHEYEN, supra note 35, at 56.
48 Id.  at 56; see also  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at  http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
to a great extent, codified international customary law. See  Malgosia Fitzmaurice,
The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties , in INTERNATIONAL LAW 190 (Malcolm
D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006).
49 See, e.g. , PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 524-26 (2d ed. 2002); PHILLIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTER-
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 361-65 (2d ed. 2003).
50 UNFCCC, supra  note 29, art. 4(2).
51 Id.
52 See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra  note 49, at 526; SANDS, supra  note 49, at 364-65.
Some commentators have argued that the legal status of this article is questionable.
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tailed emissions-reduction obligations for industrial countries,53
but these too remain insufficient considering that the United
States and Australia have not ratified the Protocol.
Article 14 of the Climate Convention offers the parties various
opportunities to settle their disputes.54  If parties wish to submit
their problem to legal dispute settlement, they may declare so in
a written instrument.55  However, only one such declaration has
been made to date.56 Article 14, paragraph 5 includes rules for a
conciliation procedure.57  This procedural alternative permits a
small island state to launch an investigation to determine
whether any damage it has sustained is related to the climate pol-
icy practiced in another country.58  Based on this investigation, a
non-binding recommendation would be suggested to resolve the
dispute.59  In this way, the small island states could authorita-
tively resolve uncertainties related to the relationship between
the causes of climate change and the damages resulting from
them.
This conciliation procedure may not yet be available because
the Conference of the Parties has not satisfied the precondition
of approving rules for its application.60  Article 13 of the Climate
Convention requires the Conference of the Parties to consider
the establishment of a multilateral consultative process during its
See, e.g. , Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change: A Commentary , 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451, 516 (1993).
53 Kyoto Protocol, supra  note 3, art. 3.
54 UNFCCC, supra note 29, art. 14.
55 Id.  art. 14(2).
56 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Status of Ratifica-
tion (2007), http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/status_of_
ratification/application/pdf/unfccc_conv_rat.pdf (declaration number eleven, Solo-
mon Islands).  Upon ratification of the Climate Convention, the Solomon Islands
accepted the arbitration as a means for settling their disputes over the interpretation
and application of the Climate Convention with another party having made the
same declaration.
57 UNFCCC, supra  note 29, art. 14(5).
58 YAMIN & DEPLEDGE, supra  note 9, at 383.
59 UNFCCC, supra  note 29, art. 14(6).
60 See Andrew L. Strauss, The Legal Option: Suing the United States in Interna-
tional Forums for Global Warming Emissions , 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,185, 10,188
(2003) (referring to article 14(6), which requires the Conference of the Parties to
approve detailed rules on the conciliation procedure).  However, it is also possible to
interpret this provision merely as a simple amplification rather than an absolute con-
dition. See  UNFCCC, supra note 29, art. 14(6)-(7) (“Additional procedures relating
to conciliation shall be adopted by the Conference of the Parties, as soon as practica-
ble, in an annex on conciliation.”).
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first session.61  This process would be available to parties upon
request for the resolution of questions regarding the implementa-
tion of the Convention.62  While this multilateral consultative
process was indeed developed by the Conference of the Parties,
its development ceased after acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol
and its Compliance Committee.63
The Compliance Committee handles breaches of obligations
set forth in the Kyoto Protocol.64  Although the Compliance
Committee has extensive authority, particularly in its enforce-
ment division,65 it is unlikely that the small island states would
present it with their legal demands for two reasons.  First, the
worst greenhouse emitters remain outside the Protocol, and as
developing nations, China and India have no binding obligation
to reduce their emissions.  Second, the Compliance Committee
only investigates whether parties to the Kyoto Protocol are ob-
serving their obligations.66  The Committee has no authority gen-
erally to investigate claims for compensation of damages due to
climate change.
To summarize, the climate regime essentially offers no oppor-
tunities for small island states to take the worst greenhouse gas
emitters to the regime’s own legal proceedings.  A better oppor-
tunity may indeed lie in appealing to general international law
and to the rules governing state responsibility.  As mentioned
above, Tuvalu (later joined by Kiribati and the Maldives) an-
nounced in 2002 that it was taking Australia to the ICJ.67  At the
same time, it stated that it was seeking refuge for its population
as environmental refugees in Australia and New Zealand.68
61 UNFCCC, supra note 29, art. 13.
62 Id.
63 See VERHEYEN, supra  note 35, at 117.
64 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Introduction,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/introduction/items/3024.php (last vis-
ited Oct. 20, 2007).
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See BBC NEWS, supra note 15.
68 Jacobs, supra  note 21, at 109; see also  Akiko Okamatsu, Problems and Pros-
pects of International Legal Disputes on Climate Change , BERLIN CONFERENCE ON
THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (2005),
http://web.fu-berlin.de/ffu/akumwelt/bc2005/papers/okamatsu_bc2005.pdf (provid-
ing further detail and background).
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B. General International Law
General international law provides some opportunities for ad-
vancing climate change litigation.  It might even be possible to
ask whether major greenhouse gas emitters are committing inter-
national crimes by failing to enact policies to combat climate
change.  At one stage of the United Nations International Law
Commission’s (ILC) project on state responsibility, this kind of
argument could have been made. Draft Article 19, paragraph 3
provided that:
Subject to paragraph 2, and on the basis of the rules of inter-
national law in force, an international crime may result, inter
alia, from . . . (d) a serious breach of an international obliga-
tion of essential importance for the safeguarding and preserva-
tion of the human environment, such as those prohibiting
massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas .69
Based on this language, a state’s deliberate unwillingness to
reduce its considerable greenhouse gas emissions would seem to
qualify as massive pollution of the atmosphere, especially be-
cause the effects of climate change are both substantial and long-
standing.  However, the distinction between international crimes
and international delicts proved controversial and was dropped
just before the ILC adopted the articles on state responsibility in
2001.70  As a result, the whole concept of state crimes is now
bathed in uncertainty.71
It is also possible to argue that some of the principles of inter-
national environmental law have become part of general interna-
tional law and therefore require reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions from all states of the world.  Small island states could
rely on the principle of equity between generations and/or the
precautionary principle, but the legal status of these principles is
69 Draft Articles on State Responsibility , 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 30, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.l (Part 2), available at  http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/
yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1980_v2_p2_e.pdf (emphasis added).  The issue of
international crimes was still debated in 1998 by the International Law Commission.
See State Responsibility , [1998] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 60-76, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1998/Add.l (Part 2), available at  http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/
yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1998_v2_p2_e.pdf.
70 See U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Inter-
nationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries , ch. 3, ¶ 7 (2001), available at http://
untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.
71 See State Responsibility , [1998] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 77, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1998/Add.l (Part 2), available at  http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/
yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1998_v2_p2_e.pdf.
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unclear.72  State responsibility could also be based on the theory
of due diligence, which is an accepted principle of international
law.73
Even though Tuvalu has tried to institute proceedings against
Australia and the United States, there has been no progress in
these matters.  The central reason for this standstill is jurisdic-
tional.  The ICJ’s jurisdiction is confined to only those disputes to
which both parties have given their consent.74  It is difficult to
imagine that the United States, for instance, would consent to
handling this kind of dispute in the ICJ.75
Even if the ICJ did have jurisdiction, many other obstacles im-
pede proceeding and succeeding with a case such as Tuvalu’s.76
72 See Jacobs, supra  note 21, at 121-28.
73 Richard S.J. Tol & Roda Verheyen, State Responsibility and Compensation for
Climate Change Damages—A Legal and Economic Assessment 32 ENERGY POL’Y
1109, 1110-15 (2004).  The due diligence, or no-harm, principle is the most clearly
accepted principle of international environmental law:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own re-
sources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies,
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-
14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development , Principle 2, U.N. Doc
A/CONF.151/5 (June 14, 1992), available at  http://www.unep.org/documents.multi
lingual/default.asp?documentID=78&articleID=1163.  Verheyen considers that “ar-
eas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” could also cover the climate system.
VERHEYEN, supra  note 35, at 166-68; but see, e.g. , BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra  note 49,
at 111 (arguing that this refers only to clear international areas, such as the moon or
high seas).
74 Mark L. Movsesian, Judging International Judgments , 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 65, 73-
74 (2007).  The consent does not need to be specific to the dispute before the ICJ.
Id.  For instance, many existing multilateral and bilateral state agreements include
the consent of states to submit their disputes to the ICJ. Id.  at 74.  Further, a state
can also make a declaration that it consents to the general jurisdiction of the ICJ.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36(2), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
U.N.T.S. 993, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2
=2&p3=0 (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).  There are currently sixty-five such states, but
some declarations have removed various categories of dispute from the jurisdiction
of the ICJ.  Movsesian, supra , at 74 n.46; see also  International Court of Justice,
Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, http://www.
icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited Oct. 20, 2007) (pro-
viding links to each state’s declaration).  A state can also make a declaration under
the Climate Convention that it accepts the ICJ as a dispute-resolution mechanism.
UNFCCC, supra  note 29, at art. 14.  However, no such declaration has been made.
75 Movsesian, supra  note 74, at 75 (“States tend to reject ICJ jurisdiction over
disputes that implicate significant interests.”).
76 See  Okamatsu, supra  note 68.
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Standing is one such barrier.  Although a broader construction of
standing is developing in the international legal process, deci-
sions are still largely based on promoting the interests of the
state party.77  Therefore, standing could be problematic for
Tuvalu if it raised an actio popularis lawsuit against the defen-
dants on behalf of the international community.  Equally prob-
lematic is the fact that the ICJ has never condemned a country
for damage it may cause in the future, a dimension that is at the
core of climate change litigation.78  Yet, the recent LaGrand
judgment does seem to indicate that the international law of re-
sponsibility is moving toward preventing future breaches of law
rather than only remedying past wrongs.79
It might also be possible for the small island states to “bypass”
the ICJ’s jurisdictional consent requirement by attempting to ob-
tain an advisory opinion from the ICJ.80  This approach involves
convincing the United Nations (UN) bodies to ask the ICJ to
issue an advisory opinion in order to clarify state responsibility
regarding climate change.81  The ICJ is authorized to give an ad-
visory opinion on almost any legal problem, provided that the
request is made in accordance with Article 96 of the UN Char-
ter.82  The request has to be made by the UN General Assembly,
Security Council, or other UN organization.83  Hence, an individ-
ual state cannot request an advisory opinion.  A state’s proposal
77 See  Phoebe Okowa, Issues of Admissibility and the Law on International Re-
sponsibility , in INTERNATIONAL LAW 479, 496-98 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed.
2006); but see CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 186 (2005).  On the other hand, Tuvalu could claim that the ac-
tivities of these states has already caused them material damage and that their
climate policy has caused this damage by neglecting the due diligence principle.
78 Jacobs, supra  note 21, at 128.  The problem also includes proving the causal
relation between a state’s climate policy and climate change damages. See  Oka-
matsu, supra  note 68, at 1-2; but see VERHEYEN, supra  note 35, at 248-57.
79 See  LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 515 (June 27). LaGrand  implies
that in some situations “a duty to prevent future breaches can hardly be limited to
bilateral legal relations between injured and responsible state . . . . [J]udgments
awarding guarantees and assurances of non-repetition therefore seem more likely to
have a general impact on a legal situation.”  Christian J. Tams, Consular Assistance
and Rights and Remedies: Comments on the ICJ’s Judgment in the LaGrand Case , 13
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1257 (2002), http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol13/No5/sr1.pdf.
80 See Strauss, supra  note 60, at 10,188; Jacobs, supra  note 21, at 115-18.
81 See, e.g. , Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16) (when
Morocco failed to persuade Spain to submit the Western Sahara dispute to the ICJ,
it passed a resolution at the UN General Assembly through which the ICJ was asked
to give an advisory opinion).
82 U.N. Charter art. 96.
83 See id.
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to ask for an advisory opinion must obtain a simple or two-thirds
majority in the General Assembly depending on the importance
of the decision.84  In its opinion concerning the use of nuclear
weapons, the ICJ stated that the political body itself should de-
termine what type of majority is needed to ask for an advisory
opinion.  In that case, the General Assembly considered a simple
majority to be sufficient.85
Achieving a majority within the General Assembly could be
challenging even though there are many small island states.86  In
addition, climate change is an issue that divides the state commu-
nity in quite a different way than the legality of using nuclear
weapons.87  It is surprising that there is no discussion in legal
literature as to what a request from the General Assembly would
ask for in an advisory opinion.  After all, addressing this question
is essential when evaluating whether sufficient support exists in
the General Assembly to justify requesting an advisory opin-
ion.88  The more ambitious the request, the more difficult it
would be to find allies in the General Assembly.
The ICJ did provide an interesting foundation from which to
articulate a request to the General Assembly in its advisory opin-
ion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons .89  In that
opinion, the court examined both the norms applying to the use
of nuclear weapons (such as the norms relating to war) and other
rules of international law (such as how international environmen-
tal law applies to the use of nuclear weapons).90  Based on this
type of reasoning, it seems possible to ask for an advisory opin-
ion discussing climate change policy in terms of existing legal
commitments such as the protection of certain species.
84 Id. art. 18.
85 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Req. for Advisory Op.),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7646.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2007)
(Seventy-eight votes for, forty-three against, and thirty-eight abstentions).  “Equally,
. . . the Court, in determining whether there are any compelling reasons for it to
refuse to give such an opinion, will not have regard to the origins or to the political
history of the request, or to the distribution of votes in respect of the adopted reso-
lution.”  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 237 (July 8).
86 Alliance of Small Island States, The Alliance, http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/ (last
visited Oct. 21, 2007) (stating that its membership includes forty-three states).
87 See  Strauss, supra note 60, at 10,187.
88 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 226 (July 8).
89 See generally id.
90 Id.  at 239.
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UN organizations can also request advisory opinions.91  How-
ever, this possibility arguably became more difficult when the
ICJ denied the World Health Organization (WHO) its right to
request an advisory opinion on matters related to the legality of
using nuclear weapons.92  In that case, the ICJ justified its denial
by deciding that the issue did not fall within the WHO’s man-
date.93  The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP)
would certainly qualify as an organization under whose mandate
climate change issues belong.94  However, UNEP has not been
granted general authorization by the General Assembly to re-
quest an advisory opinion as have entities such as the WHO and
the Food and Agriculture Organization.95  The governing council
of UNEP would therefore need to ask the General Assembly to
make this kind of request on its behalf or obtain the General
Assembly’s authorization to make the request itself.96
Overall, it seems possible to bring a climate change lawsuit at
the level of primary norms.  The principle of due diligence is un-
questionably a part of international law and requires states to
ensure that they cause no damage to the environment of other
states.  A small island state could claim, for example, that the
United States plays a central role in causing climate change, that
these changes damage the small island state’s property and envi-
ronment, and that the United States should therefore be held le-
gally responsible in accordance with the rules of state
responsibility.  Although such a lawsuit at the level of primary
norms seems possible, it is still difficult to make countries legally
accountable due to the limits examined above related to the sec-
ondary rules and legal procedures of international law.
91 U.N. Charter art. 96(2).
92 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66 (July 8), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/93/
7407.pdf.
93 See id.  at 80.
94 See  United Nations Environmental Programme, About UNEP: The Organiza-
tion, http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=43
(last visited Oct. 28, 2007).
95 See  Strauss, supra  note 60, at 10,187; Jacobs, supra  note 21, at 117.
96 E-mail from Masa Nagai, Legal Division, United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme, to Timo Koivurova, Director, Northern Institute for Environmental and
Minority Law (Aug. 29, 2006, 11:24 FST) (on file with author).
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C. Sector Regimes
The damages caused by climate change concern virtually every
aspect of life.  The worst greenhouse gas emitters may damage
the marine environment, the biodiversity of nature, or interna-
tional trade—all of which are protected by various international
rules and regulations and their supervisory bodies.97  A recent
example of this phenomenon is the application made by environ-
mental organizations and private citizens to include certain
places on the List of World Heritage in Danger.98  This applica-
tion was made on the basis of Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Con-
vention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage99 because climate change threatens the future
of these sites, including the Himalayas.100
Groups suffering because of climate change could also resort
to the dispute settlement mechanisms of the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea.  UNCLOS is applicable be-
cause climate change damages the marine environment through
increased shore erosion, penetration by seawater into freshwater
and groundwater reserves, damage to fish populations and fisher-
ies, and coral damage.101  The small island states could resort to
several UNCLOS articles: 192, 194, 195, 207, and 212.102  Cen-
trally, the victim groups could rely on the following language
from Article 194(2):
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activi-
ties under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not
to cause damage by pollution to other States and their envi-
ronment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities
under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the
97 See generally MEINHARD DOELLE, FROM HOT AIR TO ACTION?  CLIMATE
CHANGE, COMPLIANCE AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 255-78 (2005); VERHEYEN, supra  note 35, at 192-224.
98 See Press Release, Climate Justice, UNESCO Danger-Listing Petitions
Presented (Nov. 17, 2004), available at  http://www.climatelaw.org/media/2004Nov17.
99 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heri-
tage, Nov. 16, 1972, art. 11(4), 27 U.S.T. 37, 15 U.N.T.S. 511, available at http://
whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf.
100 See Press Release, Climate Justice, supra  note 98.  The application was re-
jected at the thirtieth World Heritage Committee meeting, although the Committee
did decide to start a climate change strategy.  Env’t News Serv., UNESCO Adopts
Climate Change Strategy for World Heritage Sites , July 11, 2001, http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/jul2006/2006-07-11-01.asp.
101 See Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, Climate Change,
http://ioc.unesco.org/iocweb/climateChange.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2007).
102 UNCLOS, supra  note 20, arts. 192, 194-95, 207, 212.
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areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with
this Convention.103
The definition of “pollution of the maritime environment” could
be interpreted to include climate change damage generating a
rise in sea temperature.  Such an interpretation is justifiable be-
cause the term in question is defined to include conducting en-
ergy into the marine environment as a form of pollution.104
States that are a party to UNCLOS are obligated to resolve
their disputes relating to its interpretation and application.105  If
they cannot resolve the dispute by themselves, it goes to a com-
pulsory procedure chosen by states on the basis of written decla-
rations they made when signing, ratifying, or acceding to
UNCLOS.106  In such a case, the forum is one of the following:
the ICJ, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS), an arbitral tribunal, or a special arbitral tribunal.107  If
the states do not approve the same compulsory procedure, the
dispute will be handled by arbitration.108
According to Article 290 of UNCLOS, a state can seek provi-
sional remedies from ITLOS, including measures to prevent seri-
ous damage to the marine environment.109  Interestingly, ITLOS
resorted to the principle of precaution in its judgment on provi-
sional measures in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases.110  Provi-
sional measures can also be sought from ITLOS when there is
another compulsory procedure for the eventual dispute.111  For
example, Tuvalu could resort to arbitration against Australia by
103 Id.  art. 194(2).
104 DOELLE, supra  note 97, at 189-98; see also  UNCLOS, supra  note 20, art. 1(4)
(“‘[P]ollution of the marine environment’ means the introduction by man, directly
or indirectly, of substances or energy  into the marine environment . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
105 UNCLOS, supra  note 20, art. 279.
106 Id.  art. 287(1).
107 Id.
108 Id.  art. 287(5).
109 Id.  art. 290(1).
110 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 38 I.L.M. 1624,
1634 (Int’l Trib. for the Law of the Sea 1999) (“Considering that there is scientific
uncertainty regarding measures to be taken to conserve the stock of southern blue-
fin tuna . . . [the Tribunal] finds that measures should be taken as a matter of ur-
gency to preserve the rights of the parties and to avert further deterioration of the
southern bluefin tuna stock[.]”).  The application of the precautionary principle by
ITLOS gives victim states better prospects for requesting provisional measures from
ITLOS based on the climate policies of a major greenhouse gas emitter.
111 UNCLOS, supra  note 20, art. 290(5).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\22-2\OEL202.txt unknown Seq: 19 27-DEC-07 14:52
2007] The Plight of Victims of Climate Change 285
claiming that Australia has infringed Article 194.112  The claim
would assert that Australia is responsible for an essential share of
the greenhouse gases now causing different forms of damage to
the marine environment of Tuvalu.  Additionally, Tuvalu could
seek provisional relief from ITLOS.113
II
INUIT VS. UNITED STATES: PETITION TO THE IACHR
REGARDING DESTRUCTIVE IMPACTS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Even though small island states have raised the possibility of
using international legal proceedings to combat climate change,
these considerations are not yet a reality.  Scholars of interna-
tional law have also surveyed various approaches to tackling cli-
mate change, but these also remain mostly theoretical.114  To
date, the Inuit Circumpolar Council’s (ICC) human rights peti-
tion against the United States is the only concrete action that has
been taken.  The ICC is an international non-governmental or-
ganization representing about 150,000 Inuit in Alaska, Canada,
Greenland (Denmark), and Chukotka (Russia).115  The ICC de-
veloped the petition, but it was eventually submitted on behalf of
the American and Canadian Inuit to the quasi-judicial
IACHR.116
The ICC made the decision to develop its human rights peti-
tion in 2003.117  It organized a press meeting at the Tenth Confer-
ence of the Parties to the Climate Convention.  In its statement,
the ICC announced for the first time that it was filing a human
112 Tuvalu could not resort to arbitration against the United States because the
United States is not a party to UNCLOS. See Status of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status
2007.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
113 Jacobs, supra note 21, at 116 (referring to this possibility in the event the
United States eventually ratifies UNCLOS).
114 See, e.g. , Michael G. Faure & André Nollkaemper, International Liability as an
Instrument to Prevent and Compensate for Climate Change , 43A STAN. J. INT’L L.
123 (2007); Sara C. Aminzadeh, Note, A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights Im-
plications of Climate Change , 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 231 (2001).
115 Inuit Circumpolar Council, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, http://inuitcircum
polar.com/index.php?ID=16&Lang=En&Parent_ID=16 (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
116 See  ICC Petition, supra note 16.
117 Inuit Circumpolar Council, Climate Change and Inuit Human Rights, ICC Ex-
ecutive Council Resolution 2003-O1 (2003), available at  http://www.inuit.org/
index.asp?lang=eng&num=244 [hereinafter ICC Executive Council Resolution].
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rights petition specifically against the United States.118  The peti-
tion alleged that the United States could be held individually ac-
countable for climate change because of its status as the world’s
largest emitter of greenhouse gases.119  The petition further al-
leged that the effects of these gases contravened many human
rights of the Inuit.120  The ICC also emphasized that the IACHR
was a proper forum in which to file the petition based on the
IACHR’s existing case practice.121
Sheila Watt-Cloutier, the ICC’s chairperson at the time, sub-
mitted the Inuit petition to the IACHR on December 7, 2005.122
The petition named sixty-three other Inuit petitioners and was
made on behalf of these people and all the Inuit living in the U.S.
and Canadian Arctic regions.123  Ms. Watt-Cloutier gave notifica-
tion of filing during a side event at the Eleventh Conference of
the Parties to the Climate Convention in Montreal, which also
served as the first Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol.124
A. The Inuit Petition
When drafting the petition, the ICC received a great deal of
assistance from environmental non-governmental organizations
such as the Center for International Environmental Law125 and
Earthjustice.126  The ICC also received help from specialists in
the field of indigenous peoples’ human rights, such as Professor
118 Press Release, Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law, Inuit Leader Sheila Watt-Cloutier An-
nounces Intention to File a Human Right Claim Against the U.S. for Its Dangerous
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.ciel.org/Climate/Lawsuit_
Inuit_15Dec04.htm.
119 ICC Petition, supra  note 16.
120 Id. at 5.
121 See  Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Speech
Notes from the Tenth Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/
index.php?ID=282&Lang=En.
122 ICC Petition, supra  note 16.
123 Id.
124 Press Release, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Inuit Petition Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights to Oppose Climate Change Caused by the United States
of America (Dec. 7, 2005), http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=316&
Lang=En.
125 See  Center for International Environmental Law, Climate Change: CIEL Rep-
resenting Inuit in Human Rights Case (Feb. 25, 2005), http://www.ciel.org/Climate/
Climate_Inuit.html.
126 See  Press Release, Earthjustice, Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights to Hold Hearing on Global Warming (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.earth
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James Anaya, who has considerable experience with the
IACHR.127
The ICC decided to submit a human rights petition with the
IACHR for several reasons.  First, it was not possible to appeal
to the Human Rights Committee, which monitors the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, because the United States is not a
party to the optional protocol that grants individuals the right to
make communications against state parties.128  Therefore, the
Covenant’s optional protocol granting individuals the right to
make communications against state parties was not available.
Furthermore, the United States has not ratified the Inter-Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, so the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights was also unavailable.
The IACHR appeared to be the most appropriate body to han-
dle the petition because it had previously recognized the connec-
tion between human rights and a state’s environmentally
hazardous actions.129  Therefore in principle, the IACHR could
handle the impact of climate change as a human rights issue.  An-
other positive characteristic of the IACHR is its ability to con-
sider how human rights claims are being handled outside of the
Inter-American human rights system.130
justice.org/news/press/007/inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-Hearing-on-
Global-Warming.html.
127 See  ICC Executive Council Resolution, supra  note 117.
128 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm.
129 See, e.g. , Yanomami Indians v. Brazil, Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 12/85, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1, ¶ 2 (1985), available at http://www.
cidh.oas.org/annualrep/84.85eng/Brazil7615.htm; Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, OEA/Ser.L/
V/II.96, doc. 10 rev. 1, at ch. 7 (1997), available at  http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/
ecuador-eng/index%20-%20ecuador.htm.
130 See, e.g. , Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case
12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. ¶ 86
(2004), available at  http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2004eng/Belize.12053eng.
htm.  Both the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the European Commission of
Human Rights have recognized the connection between human rights and environ-
mental protection. See  Richard Desgangné, Integrating Environmental Values into
the European Convention on Human Rights , 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 263, 263, 267 (1995).
In the Lubicon Lake Band  case, the Human Rights Committee viewed that the eco-
nomic activities permitted by Canada to the Band’s traditional territories violated
their culture and traditional livelihoods protected by Article 27 of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.  Jérémie Gilbert, Historical Indigenous Peoples’ Land
Claims: A Comparative and International Approach to the Common Law Doctrine
on Indigenous Title , 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 583, 594-95 (2007).
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Specific requirements determine how a petition to the IACHR
is investigated.131  According to these procedural rules, private
individuals or groups within the OAS member-states may file a
petition.132  Petitions may also be filed by legally recognized non-
governmental organizations in one or more member-states.133
These petitioners can file on their own behalf or for a third
party.134  Third parties include indirect victims of human rights
infringements.135
In addition to setting forth a clear basis for its existence, a peti-
tion must explain whether domestic legal remedies have been ex-
hausted and whether legal recourse has been sought from other
international human rights bodies.136  The IACHR’s rules of pro-
cedure allow for several exceptions to the exhaustion of domestic
remedies if, for example, national means for a legal remedy are
ineffective.137  The Inuit’s petition reviews the possible avenues
for legal remedies in the U.S. justice system.  In particular, the
petition attempts to show that the U.S. Constitution, tort laws,
and environmental laws and regulations do not provide an effec-
tive remedy for the human rights violations suffered by the Inuit
as a result of the United States’ actions and omissions relating to
climate change.138
Professor Anaya and the ICC believe the petition has an excel-
lent possibility of success.139  However, given the unique charac-
ter of the case, the petition could very well be held manifestly
groundless and therefore inadmissible.140  After all, asking the
IACHR to pronounce the existence of a causal link between U.S.
climate policy and Inuit human rights is a geographical stretch if
nothing else.
131 See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
OAS Special Res., 109th Sess. (2000) (amended 2006), available at  http://www.cidh.
oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic18.Rules%20of%20Procedure%20of%20the%20
Commission.htm [hereinafter Rules of Procedure].




136 See id.  art. 28.
137 See id.  art. 31.
138 See  ICC Petition, supra  note 16, at 112-16.
139 See  ICC Executive Council Resolution, supra  note 117.
140 See  Rules of Procedure, supra  note 131, art. 34(b).
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On the other hand, the IACHR has the reputation of being a
progressive and innovative body in the field of human rights.141
As previously mentioned, the IACHR’s earlier cases demon-
strate that it recognizes the connection between human rights
and the environment.  However, there is a clear difference be-
tween the ICC’s petition and earlier cases.  In all the previous
cases, the question concerned a local environmental problem.142
Thus, the responsible party and the factors causing the problem
could be determined with reasonable certainty.143  In the Inuit
case, the focus is on a complex, global environmental issue in
which causes and impacts are still to some degree unclear.  Even
though current research persuasively shows that climate change
is a human-induced phenomenon144 and that its effects infringe
on the human rights of the Inuit,145 holding the United States
solely accountable for what is clearly a global environmental
problem is a tremendous leap to make despite the United States’
role in generating greenhouse gases.
Since the United States is not a member-state of the American
Convention on Human Rights,146 the petition primarily relies on
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
(American Declaration)147 as its legal foundation.148  Why does
the petition invoke a non-binding declaration of human rights?
If the defendant-state is not a party to the American Convention
on Human Rights but is a member of the OAS, the Statute of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights enables the
American Declaration to be used as a source of law.149
141 Megan Mooney, How the Organization of American States Took the Lead: The
Development of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in the Americas , 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
553, 570-71 (2007).
142 See supra note 130.
143 Id.
144 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 2 (2007), available
at  http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm.
145 See ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra  note 22, at 649-90.
146 Organization of American States, Office of International Law: B-32: American
Convention on Human Rights, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-32.html
(last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
147 Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, 1948, O.A.S. Off. Rec., OEA/Ser.L./V./II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6, available
at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga-res98/eres1591.htm.
148 See  ICC Petition, supra  note 16, at 74-95.
149 See  Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 20,
OAS Res. 447, 9th Reg. Sess. (1979), available at  http://www.oas.org/XXXVGA/
english/doc_referencia/Estatuto_CIDH.pdf.  Although this document is not legally
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However, the Inuit petition does not rely on the American
Declaration alone; it also invokes the American Convention on
Human Rights.150  The petition states that the IACHR has itself
said, “The Commission has acknowledged that the American
Convention on Human Rights ‘may be considered to represent
an authoritative expression’ of the rights contained in the Ameri-
can Declaration, and is therefore properly considered in inter-
preting the Declaration’s provisions.”151  Upon this basis, the
petition also invokes the case practice of the IACHR and the
case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights because
both have discussed the individual rights enshrined in the Ameri-
can Declaration.152  According to the IACHR’s case practice,
“the American Declaration[ ] should be interpreted and applied
in the context of developments in the field of international
human rights law.”153  The petition thus argues that various im-
portant international human rights instruments—the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,154 the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,155 other re-
gional conventions on human rights, and ILO Convention No.
169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples156—and the prac-
tice of their supervisory bodies should be used when interpreting
the individual rights of the American Declaration.157
binding as a declaration, it has achieved international legal relevance through the so-
called double-incorporation. See  Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights
Law, Soft and Hard , in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BIND-
ING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 393, 397 (Dinah Shelton ed.,
2000).  First, this declaration was included in the Statute of the Commission on
Human Rights in 1960 at a time when the legal status of the Commission on Human
Rights was still unclear. Id.  Secondly, an amendment incorporated the Commission
on Human Rights into the OAS Charter in 1970. Id.  In this way, the declaration on
human rights evolved to become legally binding and as such it has also been treated
in the case-practice of the Commission on Human Rights. Id.
150 ICC Petition, supra  note 16, at 96.
151 Id.  at 96 (quoting Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Re-
port No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1, ¶ 125 (2002)).
152 Id.
153 Id.  (quoting Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize,
Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. ¶
95 (2004)).
154 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra  note 128.
155 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature  Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
156 International Labour Organisation, Convention Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, I.L.O. No. 69, 28 I.L.M.
1382 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991).
157 ICC Petition, supra  note 16, at 96-97.
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Citing a wide range of norms, the Inuit petition identifies vari-
ous human rights violated by U.S. climate policy, particularly be-
cause several calculations show that America is the largest single
contributor to climate change.158  The petition incorporates many
different sources of scientific evidence to prove that climate
change is caused by human activity and to demonstrate the de-
gree to which warming and its resulting changes have taken
place.159  The third assessment report by the IPCC of 2001 pro-
vides a firm foundation for this evidence,160 but the Inuit petition
also alleges that the research institutes and assessments ordered
by the Bush Administration itself show that climate change is
due to human activity.161
The petition also discusses how climate change has already re-
sulted in extensive damage to the Inuit’s traditional areas be-
cause snow and ice react so quickly to climate warming.162  These
changes have been occurring in the Arctic since the 1960s and
are confirmed by the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
(ACIA),163 the Inuit’s own observations,164 and the assessments
ordered by the Bush Administration.165 ACIA’s data is particu-
larly significant because of the extensive coverage it provides re-
garding various impacts of climate change on indigenous peoples
and their cultures in the Arctic regions.166  With this information
in mind, ACIA estimates that climate change consequences will
158 See id.  at 68-69.
159 See id.  at 20-34.
160 Id.  at 29-30.
161 Id. at 30-33.
162 Id.  at 33-34.
163 ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 22.  The Arctic Council’s climate policy began
with the launch of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). TIMO
KOIVUROVA, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE ARCTIC: A STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 93 (2002).  ACIA was conducted in much the same
way as the IPCC assessments—by collecting published scientific studies and synthe-
sizing their results. Id. at 305 n.1156.  However, ACIA differed in that it was the
first regional climate change assessment, it studied the impacts of ozone depletion in
the Arctic region, and included the traditional knowledge and observations of indig-
enous peoples. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 990.  ACIA results should
influence the function of all policy-making within the Arctic Council. ARCTIC
COUNCIL, Preface to IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT
ASSESSMENT (2004); see generally ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 22; Timo Koivurova
& David VanderZwaag, The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and Prospects , 40
U.B.C. L. REV. 121 (2007).
164 ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra  note 22, at 61-98.
165 See ICC Petition, supra  note 16, at 30-33.
166 ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra  note 22, at 649-90.
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become more pronounced in the Arctic regions than elsewhere
in the world.167  For instance, ACIA predicts that the Arctic
Ocean will be free of ice during the summer by the end of this
century.168
The petition identifies many different infringements of human
rights that the Inuit have already experienced as a result of cli-
mate change.  These include: violations of the right to life, lib-
erty, and personal security (Article I); the right to residence and
movement (Article VIII); the right to inviolability of the home
(Article IX); the right to the preservation of health and well be-
ing (Article XI); the right to the benefits of culture (Article
XIII); the right to work and to fair remuneration (Article XIV);
and the right to property (Article XXIII).169  The petition asserts
that these rights should be interpreted in light of the develop-
ment of human rights in the Inter-American system of human
rights and the evolution of the whole human rights regime in in-
ternational law.170
The Inuit petition also urges the IACHR to take into consider-
ation the international customary and treaty law to which the
United States has legally committed itself.171  Both the IACHR
and Inter-American Court of Human Rights have stated that if
other international legal obligations of the OAS member states
are relevant in resolving human rights petitions, those responsi-
bilities should be taken into consideration.172  Accordingly, the
petition refers to the United States’ obligations under the Cli-
mate Convention and the customary law principles of precaution
and due diligence.173
Regarding the Climate Convention, the petition asserts that
the United States has violated its obligation to lower its green-
house gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.174  The
United States has definitely breached this obligation if it is in-
deed binding, for as the petition asserts, the United States openly
167 Id.
168 See  ICC Petition, supra note 16, at 27-34; ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra  note 22, at
989-1020.
169 ICC Petition, supra  note 16, at 74-96.
170 Id. at 96-97.
171 See id.  at 97.
172 Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 40 (1999).
173 Id.  at 97-102.
174 Id. at 97-99.
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discarded the entire objective in its latest report to the Climate
Convention.175  The Inuit also allege that U.S. climate policy vio-
lates the nation’s due diligence obligation under customary law
to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other states.176  In addition,
the petition claims that U.S. climate policy violates the precau-
tionary principle, a principle of international law that is en-
shrined within the Climate Convention.177
B. Possible Consequences of the IACHR’s Decision
As mentioned above, the Inuit petition has received a great
deal of publicity and support.  According to Professor Anaya, the
petition may break new ground in international law.178  What can
the IACHR decide if it rules in favor of the petitioners?  First, if
the IACHR finds one or more violations of human rights, it must
draft a preliminary report outlining corrective measures.179  Fol-
lowing this action, the defendant-state has a fixed time to imple-
ment the recommendation.180  If the case is not resolved within
three months of the transmittal of the preliminary report to the
defendant-state, the IACHR can decide to issue and publish a
final report containing possible monitoring measures.181  It can
also include an annual report of the case to the General Assem-
bly of the OAS, in which event the claim will receive even greater
attention.182  It should be noted that the reports prepared by the
IACHR as well as the proposals and recommendations contained
in these reports are non-binding in international law;183 thus, the
United States cannot be legally obligated to perform any action.
As an initial step, the Inuit ask the IACHR to arrange an on-
the-spot inspection in order to verify the damages caused to the
Inuit.184  They also ask the IACHR to arrange an opportunity for
an oral hearing in which the IACHR can examine the claims
175 Id.
176 Id. at 99-100.
177 Id. at 101-102.
178 ICC Executive Council Resolution, supra  note 117.
179 Rules of Procedure, supra  note 131, art. 43.  The Commission can also recom-
mend that the parties negotiate an agreement. Id.  art. 41.  Presumably, it would be
difficult in this case for the parties to reach a mutually agreeable solution.
180 Id.  art. 43(2).
181 Id.  arts. 45-46.
182 Id.  arts. 56-57.
183 See supra note 149.
184 ICC Petition, supra  note 16, at 118.
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presented in the petition.185  The Inuit’s central goal is to have
the IACHR pronounce in its report that the United States is le-
gally responsible for infringing upon the international norms of
individual rights as set forth in the American Declaration and
other international laws.186  The Inuit also urge the IACHR to
recommend that the United States commit to fulfilling its obliga-
tions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to participate in
the climate regime.187  Although the Kyoto Protocol is not specif-
ically mentioned, the Inuit’s petition essentially asks the IACHR
to recommend that the United States ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
The Inuit also want the IACHR to encourage the United
States to pay attention to the impacts of its emissions in the Arc-
tic region and on the Inuit people before approving further major
governmental measures.188  In addition, the petition asks for a
recommendation to:
Establish and implement, in coordination with Petitioner and
the affected Inuit, a plan to protect Inuit culture and re-
sources, including, inter alia , the land, water, snow, ice, and
plant and animal species used or occupied by the named indi-
viduals whose rights have been violated and other affected In-
uit; . . . mitigate any harm to these resources caused by US
greenhouse gas emissions; [and] . . . [e]stablish and implement,
in coordination with Petitioner and the affected Inuit commu-
nities, a plan to provide assistance necessary for Inuit to adapt
to the impacts of climate change that cannot be avoided
. . . .189
As discussed above, it is difficult to say whether the Inuit petition
will succeed.  On the upside, the Inuit set forth compelling evi-
dence detailing how climate change has already caused concrete
damage to their land and people.  However, this is a unique
human rights petition, and the petition asks the IACHR to ex-
tend its reach across countries and issues.  Even progressive,
quasi-judicial bodies have to consider petitions of this kind in
light of their role as bodies that resolve concrete infringements of
human rights.  The IACHR’s recent move to organize an oral
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seems to indicate that the petition may already be experiencing
problems at the admission stage.190
If the Inuit petition does succeed, its success would add a sig-
nificant amount of credibility to the perception of climate change
as a human rights problem.  The rights contained in the Inuit pe-
tition can be found in all major, international human rights trea-
ties.  If the IACHR declares that the United States has infringed
one or more of these rights, the door would open for all major
victims of climate change to perceive climate change as a threat
to their life, culture, etc.  In essence, the ICC’s strategy through-
out the petitioning process has been to encourage all victims of
climate change to frame their injustice as a human rights issue.191
Recently, “representatives of Arctic communities and Small Is-
land Developing States . . . formed an alliance called Many




To date, international measures taken to combat climate
change are clearly insufficient.  In addition, the political will to
make radical cuts to greenhouse gas emissions does not yet exist.
Because of this lack of political will, international law is looked
upon as a savior in much the same way as when the civil society
190 Letter from Ariel E. Dulitzky, Assistant Executive Sec’y, Inter-Am. Comm’n
on Human Rights, to Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar Conference
(Feb. 1, 2007), http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legal_docs/inter-american-
commission-on-human-rights-inuit-invite.pdf.
191 Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Plenary Interven-
tion at the Tenth Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (Dec. 17, 2004), available at  http://www.inuitcircumpolar.
com/index.php?ID=283&Lang=En.
[Conferences of the Parties] should discuss the current and projected im-
pacts of climate change on human rights—particularly the human rights of
Indigenous Peoples who are particularly vulnerable to climate change.
You can’t ignore this dimension much longer.  People around the world
know that climate change affects their lives, and responding is not just
about carbon sinks, emission trading schemes, and technology transfers.  If
you want to engage the world talk about the human rights of global climate
change.
Id.
192 Press Release, United Nations Envtl. Programme Key Polar Ctr., Many Strong
Voices Join Forces on Climate Change (May 10, 2007), http://polar.grida.no/news.
cfm?pressReleaseItemId=1066.
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movement tried to influence international nuclear policy by
pressing the UN General Assembly to request an advisory opin-
ion from the ICJ.  Legal scholars are now considering how inter-
national legal proceedings could be exploited to resolve the
political deadlock surrounding climate change.
The general or ambiguous construction of the primary norms
of international law provides ample opportunity to interpret
them in a climate-friendly manner.  While this potential for inter-
pretation certainly exists, the secondary norms of international
law lack force.  The ICJ’s recent jurisprudence indicates that sec-
ondary norms are growing stronger, but they have not yet
evolved to the extent that they can be successfully invoked in
international legal proceedings.  Moreover, the various problems
associated with procedure and jurisdiction hamper taking climate
change claims to international legal proceedings.
Different methods of dispute settlement are available to han-
dle claims relating to rules and regulations of particular interna-
tional laws.  However, the dispute settlement and supervisory
bodies administering these laws were established to promote spe-
cific areas of interest, not to resolve climate change.  Accord-
ingly, these bodies may be quite reluctant to allow their dispute
settlement procedures to be used to combat climate change, es-
pecially when a specific regime has been created to solve this
problem.
As the only body charged with resolving disputes for all the
different sub-areas of international law, the ICJ may be in the
best position to take a stance on issues related to climate change.
However, the ICJ has only limited ability to make radical deci-
sions.193  Since the ICJ’s jurisdiction is based on the consent of
states, the ICJ has to be careful not to lose the trust of the state
community.  If it makes a decision that is considered extreme,
there may be a decline in the willingness of states to submit their
disputes to the ICJ.  The same logic extends to the ICJ’s use of
advisory opinions.  A radical statement would weaken the state
community’s trust in the ICJ.
International law functions best when an arbitral tribunal de-
termines the international boundary of two neighboring states or
when a human rights court decides a case between an individual
and her state.  The decisions favoring indigenous peoples in the
193 But see DOELLE, supra  note 97, at 320-26.
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Inter-American human rights system have also been very con-
crete cases in which the state or companies have physically bro-
ken into traditional areas of indigenous peoples.  Environmental
disputes that have gone to legal dispute settlement have also con-
cerned concrete cases of pollution (or the possibility of pollution)
between neighboring states.194  As a global problem, climate
change is poorly suited to being handled by today’s international
legal proceedings.195  All the states in the world contribute to cli-
mate change to some degree, and its damage impacts various re-
gions in very different ways.
Although some parts of the planet are already heavily im-
pacted, the damage caused by climate change will materialize
gradually during the coming decades.  Presently, it will be diffi-
cult for victims of climate change to take their cases to interna-
tional legal proceedings because these proceedings can remedy
only damage that has already been caused.  As indicated above,
international law may be slowly moving toward remedying future
wrongs, but it has not yet reached that point.  Since the concrete
effects of climate change can already be verified in the Arctic
region, the Inuit human rights petition is the best current possi-
bility for success.  Still, the petition will probably face many
twists and turns on its road.
In the future, it is unclear whether the climate regime will be
able to enact a more efficient and long-term climate policy.  Even
if it does not, the urgency for a legal solution will increase as the
impacts of climate change start to become more concrete in dif-
ferent regions of the world.  Another and perhaps more likely
alternative is that the materialization of the damages caused by
climate change will gradually increase the opportunities for a po-
litical solution to the issue.  Unfortunately, measures taken to re-
duce emissions at that point in time will probably be too late.
The major victims of climate change are currently facing a
most unjust situation.  Their land and culture may soon be de-
stroyed by the effects of climate changes caused almost exclu-
sively by others.  It looks as if these groups will have a difficult
time finding justice even if they rely on international law in its
194 See, e.g. , Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25); Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A.
281 (1957); Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).
195 See  Jutta Brunnée, Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International Lia-
bility Regimes as Tools for Environmental Protection , 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 351,
353 (2004).
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present form.  At the moment, it does not seem likely that indi-
vidual states’ legal responsibility could be enforced via interna-
tional legal proceedings for the damages they have caused via
their climate policy.
For the major victims of climate change, the most significant
and immediate consequence of their legal strategy might not be
winning their case.  By making public their legal claims against
the worst polluters, victims are able to improve their position in
the effort to combat climate change.  The climate regime involves
a great number of actors and many structures of decision-mak-
ing.196  Publishing their legal claims allows small states and indig-
enous peoples to reinforce their activities in the climate regime
and obtain a louder voice in the global regime.  For example, the
ICC consciously brought its human rights petition to the public
eye during its drafting phase and organized press meetings dur-
ing the Climate Convention’s Conference of the Parties.  The
ICC’s actions demonstrate how to effectively challenge both the
basic rules prescribed by the climate regime and the structure
upheld by international law as a society of states.197  By raising
the human rights petition against the United States, the Inuit ex-
panded society’s notion of who is entitled to participate in the
fight against climate change.
Through their consolidated agency, the major victims of cli-
mate change also brought their plight—their homeland falling
below sea level and the death of their culture—into the public
eye.  This message challenged the climate regime’s view that cli-
mate change is a problem that we can control and manage.  By
presenting climate change as a question of survival for them-
selves and the whole human race, the Inuit and Tuvaluans have
helped transform climate change from a low-grade political prob-
lem into one of the most compelling political problems of our
time.
Moreover, the Inuit support the characterization of climate
change as an issue of security policy.  Action to counter climate
196 See YAMIN & DEPLEDGE, supra  note 9, at 30-59.
197 See  Timo Koivurova & Leena Heinämäki, The Participation of Indigenous
Peoples in International Norm-Making in the Arctic , 42 POLAR REC. 101 (2006),
available at  http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltext
id=435124 (arguing that by consolidating the agency of ICC in the climate change
regime, the petition process might also have consequences for the Inuit agency in
general in international relations, and also contribute to the new ways of seeing how
indigenous peoples should be involved in international cooperation).
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change should thus be taken just as seriously as matters falling
within the sphere of international security policy, such as the war
against terrorism or the proliferation of nuclear weapons.198  The
political definition of a social problem often affects the kind of
resources devoted to solving it.  Therefore, climate change vic-
tims should consider their legal strategies successful if they con-
tribute to reframing the political problem in a way that fosters
more popular support.
198 See BILL MCSWEENEY, SECURITY, IDENTITY AND INTERESTS: A SOCIOLOGY
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 45-67 (1999); see also  Lorraine Elliott, Expanding
the Mandate of the United Nations Security Council , in REFORMING INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: FROM INSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO INNOVATIVE RE-
FORMS 204-22 (W. Bradnee Chambers & Jessica F. Green eds., 2005) (discussing the
securitization of environmental problems); but see  Monica Tennberg, Environmental
Threats, Governmentality and Security in Northern Europe, in NORTH EUROPEAN
AND BALTIC SEA INTEGRATION (Lars Hedegaard & Bjarne Lindström eds., 2002)
(offering a critical perspective of the concept).  The securitization of climate change
might translate into legal rules and doctrines similar to those establishing obligations
of protection for the whole community of states (responsibility to protect) in cases of
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. See R2P: Now
an International Doctrine, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/
features/383?theme=alt5 (last visited Oct. 28, 2007).  It is well worth questioning
whether the Tuvaluans for example should be able to enjoy such protection as out-
lined in the 2005 World Summit. See id.  Interestingly, the United Kingdom raised
the issue of climate change in the Security Council of the UN.  Paul Reynolds, Secur-
ity Council Takes on Global Warming , BBC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2007), http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/americas/6559211.stm.
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